This paper uses a sample of over 2,500 firms from 27 countries to investigate the relation between internal firm-level corporate governance, external country-level corporate governance, and analyst following. We find that analysts are less likely to follow firms with potential incentives to withhold or manipulate information, such as when the Family/Management group is the largest control rights blockholder. Further, valuation regressions imply that increases in analyst coverage can mitigate the reduction in value associated with potentially poor firm-level corporate governance. This effect is most pronounced for firms from countries with poor external corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that analysts add the most value when they cover firms with the least amount of internal and external corporate governance.
Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between analyst activity and corporate governance. Using a sample of 2510 firms from 27 countries, we provide evidence on the following questions: Does the internal and external corporate governance structure of a firm affect the level of analyst following? Do analysts serve as a valuable firm-specific external mechanism of corporate governance? If so, does the value of analyst following depend upon the strength of other existing corporate governance provisions? The answers to these questions contribute to our understanding of the incentives and consequences of analyst activity as well as the mechanisms by which corporate governance operates.
Classic agency theory proscribes that when controlling managers have less than full cash flow ownership stakes in their firm, there will be an inherent conflict between these managers and their outside investors [Jensen and Meckling (1976) ]. Corporate governance mechanisms are the means by which managers are persuaded to act in the outside investors' interest. Broadly speaking, governance mechanisms are generally classified into two categories: (1) country-specific external mechanisms, such as shareholder protection, the rule of law, and the market for corporate control and (2) firm-specific internal mechanisms, such as ownership structure and managerial incentive provisions. In this paper, we propose and test the hypothesis that the information gathering of financial analysts provides valuable corporate governance. In so doing, we examine whether financial analysts provide a third type of corporate governance; namely, one that is external, yet firm-specific.
The link between financial analysts and corporate governance is natural, since analysts, as outsiders, play an important role in the gathering and dissemination of firmspecific information. By improving the information environment of the firm, analyst following has been shown to lower cost of capital and increase market value [see e.g., Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) ]. Further, research by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) , Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) , Faccio and Lang (2002) , and Lins (2003) indicates that when country-specific external governance mechanisms are weak, firm-specific internal governance is often potentially poor as well. Specifically, this research has found that countries with few shareholder rights and a weak rule of law tend to have publicly traded companies in which the control held by insiders is highly concentrated and often exceeds their proportional cash flow ownership. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) and Lins (2003) suggest that outside investors recognize this incentive and power to expropriate and discount the shares of firms with these potentially severe agency problems. Thus, when firms have internal governance problems and country-level external governance is weak, firm-specific external governance provided by analysts could be relatively important.
We first examine the relation between analyst following and corporate governance.
A crucial factor regarding the effectiveness of firm-specific external governance mechanisms, and hence firm value, is information availability , La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter LLSV) (1997, 1998) ].
However, Ball (2001) and argue that the internal governance structure of the firm is also likely to affect the supply and demand for information. In its most basic application, the firm's information environment determines how well investors are able to estimate cash flows, and, in particular, determines the degree to which investors can detect managerial expropriation such as asset transfers, excessive perquisite consumption, and outright theft of earnings. Therefore, we expect that firms with concentrated insider ownership are likely to have worse information environments for at least two reasons. First, they are likely to disclose less to the market to protect their vested interests and, second, they are likely to attract less private information acquisition. Each of these factors should influence analyst following.
Consistent with the hypothesis that concentrated insider ownership is associated with less information, Fan and Wong (2002a) find that concentrated ownership is linked with low earnings-return correlation in East Asia. They propose that this low value relevance of earnings is caused by the negative effect of concentrated ownership on investors' perceptions of the credibility of the reported earnings. Their findings suggest that concentrated ownership reduces disclosure of proprietary information about the firm's rentseeking activities, which reduces the informativeness of reported earnings. Therefore, to the extent that poor firm-level governance decreases the quantity and quality of information available to the market, it should increase the cost of following a firm, which could lower coverage by investment analysts. Similarly, analysts might be dissuaded from following poorly-governed firms because they perceive them to be of lower quality and, therefore, of less potential interest to their potential investor base. Firms with concentrated ownership might also be less interesting to analysts and investors because they have a relatively low percentage of shares that float freely [Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) ].
The prediction that firms with concentrated ownership will have poor information environments is also consistent with the investor relations literature, which suggests that a benefit of increased disclosure is increased analyst following.
1 In addition, this prediction suggests that a firm's disclosures and the information produced by analysts complement 1 See, for example, Mahoney (1991) and Marcus and Wallace (1991) . We focus our discussion on sell-side analysts since the IBES data are primarily based on their forecasts. each other. Consistent with this hypothesis, Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) find that, for U.S. firms, increased disclosure is associated with higher analyst following. 2 Internationally, Smith (2001, 2002) provide evidence of a positive correlation between analyst following and disclosure and investor protection.
Next, we investigate how governance and analyst following affect the value of a firm. In particular, we test whether increased analyst following can potentially mitigate the discount that outside investors place on firms with potentially problematic ownership structures. To do so, we test whether there is an interaction effect between analyst following and a firm's governance parameters. It is important to note that extant research on corporate governance typically focuses on a particular governance mechanism in isolation. A more complete understanding of governance requires an explicit recognition of the interactions across governance mechanisms. Therefore, while investors should benefit, in general, from increased analyst following, the effect is likely to be largest for firms with poor internal and external corporate governance.
For example, a firm in which the Family/Management group has effective voting control is likely to trade at a discount when investor protection is weak, reflecting investor concern about self-interested behavior by insiders [Lins (2003) ]. Consistent with this hypothesis, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2002) document that earnings management is more prevalent in economies with poor shareholder protection and concentrated ownership.
However, to the extent that such a firm is heavily followed by analysts, the information 2 Following the prior literature, we view the analyst following as reflecting, but not necessarily determining, a firm's information environment. For example, analyst following is intended to proxy for investor monitoring activities. While analysts' research may indeed enhance the information environment, the same incentives that attract sell-side analysts might also attract buy-side analysts and other investors.
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders might be reduced, which, in turn, could result in a lower discount.
Using firm-level data for 27 countries, we document a rich set of empirical findings on the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and extent of analyst following. We find that analyst coverage is negatively related to the overall level of Miller (1999) , Miller and Puthenpurackal (2003) , and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) show that the choice by a non-U.S. firm to issue a relatively high-disclosure U.S. however, important to note that all of these papers examine governance mechanisms that are chosen by the firm. In contrast, our study examines a mechanism (analyst following) that is not directly chosen by a firm's managers.
In addition, our work contributes to the literature that examines the impact of corporate governance on financial market development. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , LLSV (1997 LLSV ( , 1998 and Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2002) Using country-level data, Levine (2003) finds support for the "financial services view" of development that stresses the role of banks and markets in researching firms and exerting corporate control. We add to this literature by documenting a relation between insider concentration of control and analyst following and demonstrating its effect on firm value.
Further, while much of the literature takes the country as the unit of observation, we document a significant relation between corporate governance and information at the individual firm level.
Overall, our findings also add to the growing literature on the determinants of the informativeness of international financial reporting. Previous studies have shown that international institutional factors are important in understanding the properties of reported earnings (Leuz et al. (2002) ), the return-earnings correlation (Ball, Robin, and Wu (1999) , Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) , Fan and Wong (2002a) , Ali and Hwang (2000) , and Hung (2001)), and the use of Big Five Auditors [Fan and Wong (2002b) ]. Our findings suggest that a firm's ownership structure plays an important role in the quantity and quality of information available to the market. Further, we explicitly test for and find that this information production is linked to firm value.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample selection and our hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the empirical analyses used in the paper and contains the results of these analyses. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Hypotheses
To examine whether analyst activity is related to firm-level corporate governance, we obtain analyst data from the Historical I/B/E/S International database. We obtain ownership data for Western European firms from Faccio and Lang (2002) (2002) and Lins (2003) . However, these data are categorized using slightly different algorithms, which makes it difficult to construct a consistent measure for our analysis.
3 Given these difficulties, we focus our firm-level governance analysis on the control rights held by certain types of blockholders since these measures can be consistently identified for all sample countries.
Our primary proxies for a firm's likelihood to face corporate governance problems are the level of control rights held by a firm's Family/Management group and whether the Family/Management group is the largest blockholder of control rights. Given that controlling managers have private benefits of control, they may wish to conceal these benefits from non-controlling shareholders. Therefore, we might expect them to reduce the amount of (accurate) information regarding the state of the firm. For instance, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2002) argue that insiders can reduce the likelihood of outside intervention in their affairs by reducing the information content of financial statement through earnings management.
A desire to reduce information available to the market is likely to be linked to analyst coverage. Since it may be more difficult to forecast earnings for firms with controlling managers who have high private control benefits, analysts may stay away from these firms. As documented in Lang and Lundholm (1996) , analysts tend to be attracted to firms with more forthcoming disclosure policies. To the extent that insiders wish to maintain information asymmetries with the market, they will tend to disclose less. Also, outside investors may be less interested in firms with poor corporate governance since they face a higher risk of expropriation, so analysts may not be attracted to these firms, reducing the amount of private information acquisition. Further, to the extent that insiders tend to trade on information, analysts' incentives will tend to be reduced because insiders will have an informational advantage (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2002) ).
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In terms of valuation, share price is likely to be increasing in analyst following. Merton (1987) argues that investors are more likely to invest in firms with which they are familiar, resulting in increased demand and higher share prices, and investor following is likely highly correlated with analyst following. Along this line of reasoning, Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that analyst following is higher for firms that disclose more while Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) find analyst following is positively related to value.
We employ government ownership as a secondary proxy for potential firm-level governance problems. The extent to which government ownership creates governance problems related to information asymmetry is less clear theoretically. There is considerable evidence documenting the inefficiency of government enterprises, which are often driven by political rather than economic considerations [see, for example, Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994), Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) , and La Porta and
Lopez-de-Silanes (1999)], both for industrial firms and financial firms [La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (2001) ]. However, it is not clear that governmental entities are likely to expropriate assets from firms in the same way that family owners might. Further, as publicly-traded companies with substantial government ownership are often in the process of privatization, governments are likely to be particularly sensitive to claims of opacity, and may feel an increased demand for public disclosure to reassure to market in the face of additional equity offerings. Lang and Lundholm (2000) document that firms generally increase disclosure prior to equity offerings to reduce information asymmetry, which may attract additional analysts. Similarly, sell side analysts may be particularly attracted to government-controlled firms because they offer the chance for lucrative equity issuances as the firms become further privatized. Therefore, we investigate the relationship between government ownership and the information environment of the firm as an empirical issue.
As a benchmark for our results, we also test the importance of control rights held by blockholders of all types other than the Family/Management group. As a group, these blockholders are not likely to shield information flows and to consume perquisites. In fact, they may actually serve as monitors to protect their interests and, as a consequence, the interests of outside shareholders. Along this line of reasoning, Lins (2003) finds that large non-management blockholdings are positively related to value across a sample of firms from less-developed economies.
The main results of the paper are for the year 1996. This year was chosen because it best matches our ownership data. Ownership data from Lins (2003) are from the 1995/1996 period and those from Faccio and Lang (2002) range from 1996 to 1999, with the majority of sample observations occurring in 1996. We use data from the eleventh month of the fiscal year to calculate the number of analysts following a company as O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) document that analyst activity levels off after the eleventh month.
Since we are also interested in how the characteristics of analyst forecasts translate into value, we obtain valuation data from Worldscope. We use Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value in regressions that feature analyst activity and accuracy as well as control variables. 5 Tobin's Q is computed as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the denominator. This variable is winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles to alleviate the influence of outliers by setting outlying values equal to the first and ninety-ninth percentiles, respectively.
Our potential sample of non-financial firms from countries covered by I/B/E/S in 1996 that also have ownership data contains 2734 observations. Data from Lins (2003) are already matched to the Worldscope database, but those from Faccio and Lang (2002) are not. Inclusion of Worldscope variables reduces our sample by 470 firms. Because analyst activity is likely to depend on the standard deviation of returns and the historical correlation between returns and earnings (Lang and Lundholm (1996) ), we require 3 years prior I/B/E/S data for some of our regression models. Inclusion of historical earnings variables further reduces our sample by 147 firms. Overall, the sample with ownership data, Worldscope data, and I/B/E/S analyst forecast data for fiscal years 1993 to 1996 includes 2117 firms from 27 countries.
When outside shareholder protection is relatively low, private benefits of control are likely to be higher (Dyck and Zingales (2003) and Nenova (2002) ), which could increase the desire of controlling managers to withhold information about the firm. Thus, external country-level governance could, in turn, affect analyst coverage. However, it is in exactly this setting that analysts should be able to provide the greatest valuation benefit from their increased scrutiny of managers. To assess these hypotheses, we segment our sample firms based on their host country's level of shareholder protection and legal origin using variables obtained from LLSV (1998). Tests involving low shareholder protection and non-English legal origin are conducted on subsamples that range from 1252 to 1528 firms. 
The Effect of Ownership Structure on Analyst Coverage and Performance

Univariate Tests
As our first step in examining the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and analyst following, we separate each governance mechanism into two simple categories which represent "good" or "poor" governance. Table 2 reports the median analyst following for each of these breakdowns. In Panel A of Table 2 , we examine analyst coverage based on proxies for internal governance mechanisms. For example, when the firm's Family/Management group has control rights that are above the country median level, fewer analysts follow the firm (5 versus 7, p-value of difference = 0.00). Since firms in which the Family/Management group has a high level of control rights are expected to face corporate governance problems, this finding suggests that the incentives of analysts to cover these firms are lower. When the Family/Management group is the largest blockholder of control rights, we also see that median analyst coverage is lower (5 versus 7, p-value of difference = 0.00). In contrast, we find that when control held by all blockholder types other than the Family/Management group is high, the level of analyst coverage is not affected (6 versus 6, p-value of difference = 0.80). Since these outside blockholders are expected to have less ability to consume private benefits of control and, hence, greater desire to protect the cash flows that accrue to them, this result also supports the hypothesis that the degree of internal governance affects analyst following. Taken together, these univariate results suggest that analyst coverage tends to be lower for firms with poor internal corporate governance mechanisms. Lastly, Panel A of Table 2 reports analyst coverage for firms in which the Government is the largest blockholder. These firms have higher analyst following (10 versus 6, p-value of difference = 0.00), which is consistent with the ideas that privatized firms are more forthcoming with their information flows and that equity analysts wish to provide coverage to these firms to potentially earn future investment banking business.
Panel B of Table 2 reports median analyst coverage based on external governance mechanisms using two variables obtained from LLSV (1998). The first is the "Antidirector Rights" score, which ranges from 0 to 5 with lower scores corresponding to fewer shareholder rights. The second is the "Legal Origin" of a country where we make the distinction between whether or not the country has an English-based legal system. We find that analyst coverage tends to be higher for firms with poor external corporate governance mechanisms. For example, for firms that are located in countries with English legal origin, analyst following is lower (5 versus 7, p-value of difference = 0.00). In addition, firms from countries with relatively fewer Antidirector Rights (less than 5) also have more analyst coverage (6 versus 5, p-value of difference = 0.00). The finding that analysts tend to follow firms from low external corporate governance environments is consistent with Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000) . The differential effect of governance mechanisms on analyst following shown in Table 2 underscores the need to recognize their interactions, while controlling for other known determinants of analyst following. We examine this next.
Multivariate Analysis
If there are information effects associated with ownership structure, we expect to see a relation between these structures and the firm's analyst following. It is clearly important to control for other factors besides ownership that are also likely to affect the analyst coverage across firms. As such, we follow the models used in Lundholm (1993, 1996) and Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) and estimate OLS regression models of the following form: Firm size = The log of total assets converted to millions of U.S. dollars.
Return STD = The standard deviation of returns over the previous three years (winsorized at the 95 th percentile).
Returns-earnings correlation = The correlation between returns and earnings over the previous three years.
Earnings surprise = The absolute value of the difference between current earnings per share and earnings per share from the prior year, divided by the firm's stock price.
Industry controls: Indicator variables for the firm's industry.
Because we are interested in whether ownership structure affects the analyst following, we focus for the coefficient of the ownership variables. XLIST is included in the regressions because Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) and Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) find that firms with exchange-listed ADRs have greater analyst coverage. Firm size, measured as the log of total assets converted to U.S. dollars, is included in all regressions since larger firms are likely to have more analysts covering them (Bhushan (1989) and Brennan and Hughes (1991) ).
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To control for industry effects, we include industry classification dummies that correspond to one of 12 industrial classifications as outlined in Campbell (1996) . To control for cross-country effects, we first estimate all regression models using country random effects. We use the Hausman test to see whether to reject the null that country effects are random. When country random effects are rejected, we estimate our regressions with fixed country effects.
Our models also include control variables for analyst following suggested by Lang and Lundholm (1996) . These controls are the standard deviation of returns, the historical correlation between returns and earnings, and the earnings surprise. These are likely to affect analyst following because they influence both analysts' incentives to gather information and the inherent difficulty of forecasting earnings. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that return variability is negatively related to the number of analysts following a U.S.
firm, indicating that analysts prefer to follow firms with less performance variability. Low 6 We do not use the market value of equity because we hypothesize that market valuation is a function of a firm's corporate governance and information environment.
return-earnings correlation is likely to reduce analysts' incentives to follow firms because it reduces the potential returns to forecasting earnings. Finally, Lang and Lundholm (1996) include the percentage earnings surprise to control for the fact that forecast characteristics are likely to be affected by the magnitude of the earnings information to be disclosed.
Controlling for the smoothness of earnings is particularly important here because Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2002) and Fan and Wong (2002a) suggest, respectively, that firms from countries with poor investor protection and firms with poor internal governance manage earnings to mask their true results. Model 4 tests whether government control is related to analyst coverage. In contrast with the univariate findings of Table 2 , the multivariate regression indicates that analysts do not cover government-controlled firms differently than non-government-controlled firms.
The Relation between Ownership Structure and Analyst Coverage
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that governmental entities are less likely to expropriate assets from firms in the same way that family owners might. Further, as publicly traded companies with substantial government ownership are often in the process of privatization which could entail additional equity offerings, governments are likely to be particularly sensitive to claims of opacity and would thus want to keep their public disclosure at a high level.
The analysis in Table 3 groups together firms from countries with widely differing external corporate governance environments, ranging from the United Kingdom to Indonesia. To test whether the external country-level governance mechanisms of shareholder protection and rule of law affect the relation between ownership structure and analyst coverage, we employ the LLSV Antidirector Rights measure (which ranges from 0 to 5) and make the distinction between whether or not the country has an English-based legal system.
In our empirical tests, we first use a random effects model featuring an interaction between our ownership structure variables and the level of Antidirector Rights. This type of model has the potential to incorporate within-country effects of ownership and analyst coverage on value and also effects between countries. A fixed effects model is poorly suited for testing between-country effects. Unfortunately, the Hausman test rejects the null specification that country effects are random in these models. Since a random effects model is inappropriate, we test the ownership structure and analyst following relation by estimating our previous country fixed-effects model on a subset of firms from countries with low Antidirector Rights and Non-English Legal Origin. For our Antidirector Rights subsample tests, we estimate the Table 4 models using two cutoffs: countries that score below 5 and countries that score below 4 on the Antidirector Rights measure.
We find no significant differences in the coefficients on Family/Management control percentage and Family/Management is the largest blockholder between high and low protection subsamples and between legal origin subsamples. For the sake of brevity, these regression models are not tabulated. We conclude from these regressions that the prevailing external governance environment in a country does not have an impact on whether analysts choose to cover firms with poor internal corporate governance. However, as we will show in a later section, the valuation impact of analyst coverage of firms with high Family/Management control is significantly related to a country's external governance provision.
Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that the expected poor firm-level corporate governance that accompanies high levels of Family/Management control of a firm raises the cost of following the firm, which, in turn, leads to decreased coverage of the firm by investment analysts.
The Relation between Ownership Structure, Analyst Coverage, and Firm Value
Tobin's Q is our proxy for firm value and there are 2507 firms with ownership structure data and data on 1996 I/B/E/S analyst activity for which fiscal-year 1996 Tobin's Q can be computed. Table 4 reports the results of regression models in which Tobin's Q is regressed on ownership structure variables, analyst variables, and an interaction between these variables as well as controls. Since country-level factors such as investor protection can have important implications for firm value (LLSV (2002)), we employ country controls.
In a later section, we investigate whether investor protection and legal origin affect our firmlevel governance and analyst coverage results.
Analyst coverage has been shown to be positively related to Tobin's Q in an international setting (Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) ) and concentrated control in the hands of managers has been shown to be negatively related to Tobin's Q in emerging markets [Lins (2003) ]. However, there is little international evidence on whether a firm's analyst following has the potential to affect the price that outside investors are willing to pay for a firm through its effect on the behavior of controlling managers or the information asymmetry between managers and investors.
To gain new insights into this question, we focus on the interaction between ownership structure and analyst activity. To the extent that analysts add incremental value to firms with potentially poor internal corporate governance, we expect that this interaction coefficient will be positive. Table 4 shows that the coefficient on the number of analysts is positive, as expected (0.017, p-value=0.00 ). This evidence indicates that firm value is increasing in analyst following. Table 4 also shows that Family/Management control is negative but insignificantly related to value across this sample of Western European and emerging market firms. This finding is not surprising given the substantial differences in country-level investor protection. Most interesting, however, is that we find a positive and Overall, the Table 4 results indicate that analysts add incremental value to firms with potentially poor internal corporate governance. In the next section, we investigate whether this finding is also related to the level of external corporate governance provided to outside shareholders.
Shareholder Protection and Ownership Structure, Analyst Coverage, and Firm Value
When outside shareholder protection is extremely high, one might not expect there to be much of a negative relation between high levels of Family/Management control and value and that there might similarly be little room for increased analyst coverage to impact value. When investors are least protected by the law, one might expect managers to be able to expropriate outside shareholders more easily. It is also in this setting where analysts should be able to provide the greatest valuation benefit from their increased scrutiny of managers. In this section, we conduct an analysis of whether our previous results are related to the external shareholder protection of a country.
In our empirical tests, we again attempt to use a random effects model featuring an interaction between Family/Management control, analyst coverage, and the level of Antidirector Rights, since this will allow us to incorporate within-country effects of ownership and analyst coverage on value and also effects between countries. As before, the Hausman test rejects the null specification that country effects are random in these models.
Therefore, we estimate our previous country fixed-effects model on a subset of firms from countries with Antidirector Rights below 5 and below 4, and from countries with NonEnglish Legal Origin. Table 5 reports tests using the three low protection subsamples. The models show that the coefficients on the analyst variables are larger and more significant than they were in Table 4 . We find that the interaction between analysts and Family/Management control is significantly different between the low and high Antidirector rights subsamples at the 5 percent level and between the English and Non-English legal origin subsamples at the 1 percent level. There is no significant difference in the unconditional coefficients on analyst coverage between subsamples. 
Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between analyst following and a firm's internal and external corporate governance environment to see whether analysts serve as a valuable incremental mechanism of corporate governance. We document that analysts are less likely to follow firms with poor internal governance, such as when the Family/Management group is the largest control rights blockholder. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that controlling managers wish to withhold or manipulate information in order to conceal their private benefits of control from other shareholders.
We conduct valuation tests and find that the interaction of analyst coverage and concentrated Family/Management control is positively related to firm value. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts add incremental value to firms with potentially poor internal corporate governance. Further, we find that this relation is even more pronounced in countries with poor external shareholder protections. This result indicates that analysts can help to overcome poor external corporate governance of firms as well.
Overall, our findings suggest that a firm's ownership structure and external corporate governance environment play an important role in the quantity and quality of information produced by analysts, and that this information production impacts the value of the firm.
Table 1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Analyst Coverage is defined as the median number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. Size is the median value of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Tobin's Q is computed using data predominantly from fiscal year 1996 and is defined as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the denominator. Tobin's Q is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Ownership data list the median value of total direct and indirect control rights held by blockholder type. Family/Management (Mgmt) refers to ownership stakes held by family groups and the top management group. Other Blockholders (BH) refers to ownership stakes held by blockholders other than Family/Management. Largest Blockholder refers to the type of entity that has the largest percentage of control rights in a firm (Misc. refers to Trusts, Coop, Charity, Employees, etc; WH = widely held) Ownership structure data are obtained from Faccio and Lang (2002) and Lins (2003) .
Frequency ( 15 S w i t z e r l a n d 6 7 1 1 2 8 9 9 1 . 1 6 4 4 0 7 0 3 0 9 4 T a i w a n 7 6 3 3 3 1 1 . Regression estimates of Analyst Coverage on disclosure variables of interest and controls. Analyst Coverage is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. Ownership variables are defined in Table 1 . Family/Management (Mgmt) refers to control rights held by family groups and the top management group. Other Blockholders (BH) refers to control rights held by blockholders other than Family/Management. "XLIST" is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S that requires reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reporting standards. Firm size is the log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Returns-Earnings Correlation is the correlation between returns and earnings over the previous three years. Return STD is the standard deviation of the returns over the previous three years. Earnings Surprise is the absolute value of the difference between current earnings per share and earnings per share from the prior year, divided by the firm's stock price. Dummy variables for industry groups based on the classification of Campbell (1996) are included but not reported. The standard deviation of return on equity is winsorized at the 95 th percentile. All regression models are first estimated using country random effects. If the Hausman test rejects the null that country effects are random, models are estimated with fixed country effects. The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses. Regression estimates of Tobin's Q on analyst coverage and ownership structure and controls. Tobin's Q is computed using data predominantly from fiscal year 1996 and is defined as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the denominator. Tobin's Q is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Firms with financial services industry classifications are excluded from the regressions. Ownership variables are defined in Table 1 . Family/Management (Mgmt) refers to control rights held by family groups and the top management group. . "BH" refers to blockholder. An interaction variable of analyst activity multiplied by the ownership variable of interest is included. Analyst Coverage is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each "XLIST" is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S that requires reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reporting standards. Firm size is the log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Debt to assets ratio refers to the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Dummy variables for industry groups based on the classification of Campbell (1996) are included but not reported. All regression models are first estimated using country random effects. If the Hausman test rejects the null that country effects are random, models are estimated with fixed country effects. The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses. 
Table 5 Valuation Regressions in Low Shareholder Protection Countries
Regression estimates of Tobin's Q on analyst coverage and ownership structure and estimated on a subsample of countries with low shareholder protection as measured by Antidirector Rights and Legal Origin. "Antidirector Rights" values range from 0 to 5 and are obtained from Table 2 of LLSV (1998). "Legal Origin" is categorized by whether or not a country's legal system derived from English Common Law (LLSV (1998)). Three "Low Protection" subsamples are used. The first and second subsamples contain countries that score below 5 and 4 on the Antidirector Rights measure, respectively, and the third subsample contains countries with a non-English Legal Origin. Tobin's Q is computed using data predominantly from fiscal year 1996 and is defined as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the denominator. Tobin's Q is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Firms with financial services industry classifications are excluded from the regressions. Family/Management (Mgmt) refers to control rights held by family groups and the top management group. "BH" refers to blockholder. An interaction variable of analyst coverage multiplied by dummy for whether Family/Mgmt is the largest blockholder is included in each model. Analyst coverage is for fiscal year 1996 and is defined as the number of IBES analysts that report estimates for each firm. "XLIST" is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S that requires reconciliation to U.S. GAAP reporting standards. Firm size is the log of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars. Debt to assets ratio refers to the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Dummy variables for industry groups based on the classification of Campbell (1996) are included but not reported. All regression models are estimated with fixed country effects since the Hausman test rejects the null that country effects are random. The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality of the coefficient to zero is reported in parentheses. 
